

# Insurance Economics Class Problem

Finance 4335, February 23, 2023

Suppose that a consumer is subject to the following loss distribution:

State-Contingent Loss ( $L_s$ )	Probability of State ( $p_s$ )
\$0	1/3
\$2,500	1/3
\$5,000	1/3

This consumer is considering four possible strategies for dealing with this risk. Besides self-insurance, she can also consider the following three insurance policies:

- a) Policy *A* has a \$625 deductible for a premium of \$2,375;
- b) Policy *B* covers 80% of all losses for a premium of \$2,250; and
- c) Policy *C* covers 100% of all losses for a premium of \$3,000.

A. Suppose the consumer's initial wealth is \$10,000, and the only source of risk is the loss distribution. Calculate the expected value of final wealth under the four available risk management strategies (i.e., self-insurance, Policy *A*, Policy *B*, and Policy *C*).

	Self-Insurance	Policy <i>A</i>	Policy <i>B</i>	Policy <i>C</i>
$p_s$	$W_s = W_0 - L_s$	$W_{A,s} =$ $W_0 - P_A - (L_s - \max(0, L_s - d))$	$W_{B,s} =$ $W_0 - P_B - (1 - \alpha)L_s$	$W_{C,s} =$ $W_0 - P_C$
1/3	\$10,000	\$7,625	\$7,750	\$7,000
1/3	\$7,500	\$7,000	\$7,250	\$7,000
1/3	\$5,000	\$7,000	\$6,750	\$7,000
$E(W)$	\$7,500	\$7,208.33	\$7,250	\$7,000

B. What are the premium loadings for Policies *A*, *B*, and *C*?

1. The actuarially fair premium for Policy *A* is

$$\begin{aligned}
 E(I_A) &= \sum_{s=1}^n p_s (\max(0, L_s - d)) \\
 &= (1/3)\$0 + (1/3)\$1,875 + (1/3)\$4,375 = \$2,083.33.
 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, Policy *A*'s premium loading is  $\beta_A = P_A/E(I_A) - 1 = \$2,375/\$2,083.33 - 1 = 14\%$ .

2. The actuarially fair premium for Policy *B* is

$$\begin{aligned}
 E(I_B) &= \sum_{s=1}^n p_s \alpha L_s \\
 &= (1/3)\$0 + (1/3)\$2,000 + (1/3)\$4,000 = \$2,000.
 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, Policy *B*'s premium loading is  $\beta_B = P_B/E(I_B) - 1 = 2,250/2000 - 1 = 12.5\%$ .

3. The actuarially fair premium for Policy  $C$  is

$$E(I_C) = E(L) = \sum_{s=1}^n p_s L_s$$

$$= (1/3)\$0 + (1/3)\$2,500 + (1/3)\$5,000 = \$2,500.$$

Therefore, Policy  $C$ 's premium loading is  $\beta_C = P_C/E(I_C) - 1 = 3,000/2,500 - 1 = 20\%$ .

C. Suppose that  $U(W) = \ln W$ . Which risk management strategy (i.e., self-insurance, Policy  $A$ , Policy  $B$ , or Policy  $C$ ) should be selected?

The strategy that yields the highest expected utility of final wealth should be selected. Here are the expected utility calculations for the three strategies:

$p_s$	Self-Insurance $U(W_s)$	Policy A (Deductible) $U(W_s)$	Policy B (Coinsurance) $U(W_s)$	Policy C $U(W_s)$
33.33%	9.2103	8.9392	8.9554	8.8537
33.33%	8.9227	8.8537	8.8888	8.8537
33.33%	8.5172	8.8537	8.8173	8.8537
$E(U(W))$	8.8834	8.8822	<b>8.8872</b>	8.8537

Since Policy  $B$  yields the highest expected utility, this policy should be chosen. The utility rankings also indicate that the next best alternative strategy would be self-insurance, then Policy  $A$ , and the least preferred alternative would be Policy  $C$ .

Keep in mind that the "all else equal" condition required for Arrow's Theorem to hold is violated in this particular numerical example. For starters, note that  $E(I_A) > E(I_B)$ . Although this is a benefit in an expected utility sense, Policy  $A$  also has a higher premium loading (14% versus 12.5%) and therefore costs more per dollar of coverage than Policy  $B$ . Policy  $B$  has a higher expected utility than Policy  $A$  because  $A$ 's higher premium loading more than offsets the benefit of  $A$ 's greater coverage.